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ABSTRACT
Smarter people do not inherently make for better parents. Absent abuse or neglect, a parent
with a low intellectual quotient runs the risk of losing their children to the state. This Article
addresses intellectual disability as a ground for termination ofparental rights, and illustrates a
general understanding on what intellectual disability is. More notably, this Article is the first to
provide a complete state survey on intellectual disability as a ground in termination ofparental
right statutes, and specifically addresses state's termination statutes that epitomize overboard
intellectual disability language and narrow intellectual disability language. With the disability
described and the statutory language flushed out in the body of the Article, an argument is
subsequently made on the type of language states should consider employing to afford more
protections for the average intellectually disabled parent from state action. These parents should
not rely on being dealt an enlightened judge who can balance the scales ofjustice imperially; in
other words, a judge who does not adhere to the arbitrary presumption that all intellectually
disabled parents are unfit to care for their children. This Article concludes by articulating a
straightforward notion: in order to preserve the family nucleus for non-severe intellectually
disabled parents, states must cease employing overbroad statutory language.
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birth. 3 The state's justification for taking

INTRODUCTION

Christopher and Hunter away from their
"I'm not a smart man, but I know what love
.

lS.

"1

parents is grounded in the parent's limited
cognitive abilities that interfere with their
aptness to safely parent the children.

In 2013 an Oregonian couple had

4

Reunification is being sought but has yet to

their first son removed from their home

be

following

reporting

sequestered from their parents by residing in

neglect to the state's child welfare agency.

the state's foster system. In light of this

Pursuant to the report of alleged neglect, the

story,

Department of Human

Services began

surfaces in the mind: are individuals with

investigating the parents. The department

average to high IQs inherently better parents

found no signs of abuse, but reported in their

because of their ample cognitive ability?

a

family

member

achieved.

The

and many

children

others,

remam

one question

findings that the parents both have below-

For many, the ability to be a parent

average IQs. The state agency also found

and raise children is taken for granted. Good

representations

and

parents should not have their parental rights

frustrations people with learning disabilities

terminated. Absent true abuse or neglect,

face when attempting to be parents. In

like in the case outlined above, parents with

reports of concerns about the couple's

limited cognitive ability 5 can have a basic,

parenting skills, a Mountain Star 2 case

fundamental right terminated: the right to

worker recalled having to prompt the two

make

parents to have Christopher wash his hands

custody6, and control of their children7 . The

after using the toilet and to apply sunscreen

Supreme Court of the United States has long

to all of his skin rather than just his face.

recognized

Upon this information, the state removed

parents. 8 Nevertheless, parents with below

Christopher and placed him in foster care.

average IQs have been and continue to be

of

the

struggles

decisions

this

concernmg

fundamental

the

right

care,

of

Then in 2017, the couple had a

denied full enjoyment of their rights with

second son, Hunter. The state took custody

respect to care, custody, and control of their

of Hunter as well. However, this time the

children because of a condition they have,

state removed the couple's second son

not a behavior they exhibit. 9

directly from the hospital following his

105

This

article

what

and moderate intellectually disabled parents

intellectual disability is, explore the current

by using specific, narrow language in their

landscape

termination of parental rights statutes.

of

will

state

discuss

statutes

addressing

intellectual disability in termination of
parental rights, and finally propose that
states

should

eliminate

termination of parental rights statutes. Part I
of this Article will provide an in-depth
definition of intellectual disability and its
sub-classifications. Fallowing this definition
section, Part I will then provide brief
background information on the description
and definitions of intellectual disability. This
Article disallows any in-depth historical
discussion on the background of intellectual
disability, mental retardation, and mentally
Thus, an in-depth historical,

socio-economic, and social-psychological
background

of

the

aforementioned

classifications will not be discussed in this
article. Part II will discuss the current
landscape
intellectual

of

state

disability

statutes

addressing

as a ground for

termination of parental rights. Additionally,
this section will analyze the narrow and
broad language present in state's termination
statutes. Finally, Part III will offer a
proposal to states to recognize and be
cognizant

of

the

varymg

INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

overbroad

intellectual disability language in their

disability.

I. DESCRIPTION AND DEFINTION OF

classes

of

In order to understand the anatomy
of a problem, one must first have a skeletal
framework. To begin piecing this framework
together, a minor description of intellectual
disability will be provided. The description
provided in the subsequent paragraph is
essential for the reader to cognize this form
of disability, and for the development of this
article's analysis.
It has been estimated that in the
United States there are at least 4.1 million
parents with disabilities who have minor
children. 10 This group represents 6.2 percent
of the parenting population. 11 No national
study has been conducted to identify the
total number of parents with disabilities who
have been involved in the child welfare
system. 12 However, the National Center on
Parents with Disabilities and their Families
analyzed data from 19 states and found that
12.9 percent of children removed by child
welfare services had a caregiver with a
disability. 13 Multiple studies have revealed
that 30 to 50 percent of parents with

intellectual disability and, thus, protect mild
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intellectual disabilities lose custody of their

monolithic group who are categorically

biological children. 14

subdivided into mild, moderate, and severe

The

definition

of

intellectual

forms of intellectual disability. 20

disability will be defined in accordance with
the current understanding of this form of
disability. For clear comprehension, the

1. Severe Intellectual Disability

definition of intellectual disability will be
delineated below.

Severe

intellectual

disability

1s

relatively marked by an IQ of thirty-five or

A General Definition ofIntellectual

lower.

21

It

is

"organically

Disability

Organically

often
based

based

characterized

by

retardation."

22

retardation

denotes

Intelligence has systematically been

genetic, chromosomal, and other biological

defined using the Intelligent Quotient (IQ)

etiologies. 23 This group constitutes a large

test.

15

Some scholars have asserted that

portion of individuals with serious birth

Intellectual Disability "is not a disease,

defects and physical impairments. 24 Those

disorder or disability." 16 Instead, it is a label

with severe intellectual disabilities usually

for a diverse group of people. 17 Individuals

need

labeled as intellectually disabled

share

individuals with severe intellectual disability

characteristics: limitations in intelligence

are able to learn simple daily routines and to

and

deficits in

American

adaptive

Association

skills.

18

on

Mental

The

lifelong

support.

25

Moreover,

engage in simple self-care. However, these
individuals

need

supervision

in

social

Retardation lists these specific examples of

settings and often need family care to live in

adaptive behavior skills:

a supervised setting such as a group home. 26

expressive

language,

receptive and

gullibility,

money

concepts, using transportation and doing
house-keeping

activities.

19

These

characteristics suggest that this group of
individuals are homogenous. In fact, they
are not homogenous or monolithic. These
individuals

are

a

heterogeneous,

non-

For example, an Iowan mother had her
parental

rights

terminated because her

behavior mimicked behaviors of individuals
who are severely disabled:
[she had] difficulty
overcoming her intellectual
impairment to adequately
provide a safe and reliable

107

home
for
[the
child].
Furthermore, [the mother]
was unable to care for [the
child] without relying heavily
on service providers and her
mother.
She
frequently
became
angry
while
attempting to provide for [the
child] needs and developing
mobility.
[The
mother]
demonstrated a sustained
inability to understand [the
child's] developmental stages
with
age
appropriate
.
27
expectations.

2. Moderate Intellectual Disability

Moderate

intellectually

disabled

individuals have a relative IQ range of
thirty-five

to

forty-nine.

28

This

group

roughly comprises ten percent of the total
population. 29 With support and training, this
group can live and, or develop the requisite
skill set to successfully live on their own. 30
Similar to severe, moderate intellectual
disability stems from organic causes, such as

The categorical subdivision, severe,

chromosomal abnormalities, birth defects, or
brain

is not the sole focus of this Article. This

individuals

class of intellectually disabled individuals

disability can take care of themselves and

needs

most

others, travel to familiar places in their

pedestrian of tasks, let alone has the

community, and learn basic skills related to

requisite skill set to care for a child.

safety and health. Their self-care requires

However, to entirely omit this subdivision

little to no support. Unlike the classification

would be improper, and hinder the reader

of

from

intellectually disabled individuals will be

daily

graspmg

assistance

the

for

limited

the

scope

of

background provided in this Article. The

mJury.

31

will not be discussed further in detail, for it

severe,

with

this

Dissimilar

to

moderate

class

severe,

intellectual

of

moderate

discussed further in this Article. 32

extent this class will be discussed hinges on
state statutory language in later sections of

3. Mild Intellectual Disability

this article.
The majority 33 of individuals with
intellectual disabilities are classified as
mild. 34 This category of individuals has an
IQ range of fifty to seventy.

35

These

individuals can learn practical life skills,
which allows them to function in ordinary
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life with nominal levels of support, or no

integrated into society, they cannot be

support at all. 36 For example, when a father

distinguished

sought support from social services during a

disabled persons. 44 Aside from obtaining

period of impoverishment, rendering the

social benefits and support and assistance

fathers home without food or electricity,

from family and friends, individuals in this

social services did not later release the child

group can live independently and enter the

back into the fathers care. 37 Subsequently, a

job market. 45 From this point forward, the

social services agent filed a petition to

discussion of intellectual disability will refer

38

strictly to parents who fall within the

terminate parental rights of the father.

There was no evidence bearing on the issue

from

non-intellectually

classifications of moderate and mild.

of abuse or neglect of the child, and the
child was never returned to the father from
social services. 39 A psychiatrist evaluated
the father and conjecturally declared the

THE CURRENT STATUTORY
LANDSCAPE: LAW SURROUNDING
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY
II.

father intellectually disabled due to his
illiteracy. 40 The father's intelligent quotient
was never measured.

41

During trial, the

lower court relied on the psychiatrist's
speculative

report

and

testimony,

and

rendered their decision against the father.

examples

of the

problems

intellectual

disability

face

termination

based

on

a

parent's

condition, rather than a parent's behavior. 46
While no state says that disability can be
grounds by itself for termination of parental

and

prejudices parents with or perceived as
having

for

42

The case outlined above is merely one of the
many

Disability is one of the only grounds

rights, if disability is included as grounds for
termination, it can become the main focus of
a child protection case. 47

m

American jurisprudence.
Unlike the fact pattern provided
above, individuals in this subdivision are
almost always diagnosed when they are in
an environment of curricular development,
such as a school. 43 When individuals are not
in such environments, they become so

A State Responsibility and Action
in the Child Welfare System
Child welfare agencies are laudable
systems of "service designed to promote the
well-being of children by ensuring safety,
achieving permanency, and strengthening
families

to

care

for

their

children

109

successfully."

48

States

are

primarily

grounds

of intellectual

disability,

this

responsible for the child welfare systems.

judicial discretion opens a conduit for legal

State law governs cases in these systems;

bodies

despite the fact states receive federal aid and

presumptions

funding.

49

State statutes govern every aspect

54

to

give

way

when

to

bias

and

determining

the

outcome of a proceeding, hearing, or case. 55

of a child welfare proceeding. For example,

States walk a tight rope when

statutes govern who may determine when an

balancing the rights of the parent and the

investigation must be made into allegations

rights of the child. Naturally, states take

of child abuse or neglect, what types of

diverse approaches in their statutes in order

services the family may receive to promote

to balance the state's interest in the child and

reunification,

the parent's interest in the child. 56 State

parental

and when termination of

rights

are

appropriate,

thus

statutes vary in terms of grounds included

50

for termination of parental rights and in the

Aptly stated by Justice Ginsburg, the later

level of specificity with which those grounds

type of state action outlined above is

are defined.

"among the most severe forms." 51

statutes do not deem intellectually disabled

rendering the family nucleus obsolete.

57

The more favorable state

parents unfit to raise their child. The more
B.

Termination of Parental Right

Statutes

problematic statutes embrace and seamlessly
correlate

58

intellectual

disability

with

parental unfitness and ineptitude.
Like

child

Now, when a state child welfare

welfare statutes are verbose. Yet these

agency believes a child is abused or

statutes are purposely vague. Vagueness

neglected, it may seek to take remove the

creates flexibility with regard to judicial

child when the state judiciary grants such

discretion. Vague language in these statutes

action, and termination of parental rights is

permits judges to exercise broad discretion

on the table. 59 In termination of parental

in

deciding

most

state

statutes,

rights proceedings, most states require the

everyday cases, this type of discretion and

court to determine: (I) by a preponderance

flexibility is of course desired, if not

of the evidence, that reunification efforts

termination

53

cases.

52

In

appropriate.

child welfare

Nevertheless,

proceedings

are

when

based

on

were reasonable; (2) by clear and convincing
evidence, that a parent is unfit; and (3) that

110

severing the parent-child relationship is m
the child's best interest. 60 Every state 1s
responsible for establishing their statutory
grounds for termination.

1. A Minority of States
Employ Narrow Statutory Language

Within the two-thirds of states that
include intellectual disability as a factor for
terminating parental rights, there are only a

State Statutes
Intellectual Disability

Addressing

C.

have

handful of states that do not use overly
broad, vague verbiage. These states are

Approximately two-thirds of states

Kentucky,

Mississippi,

statutes

Washington,

and

that

include

intellectual

of

Virginia,

Wisconsin.

parental

rights

Their

disability as a factor for terminating parental

termination

statutes

rights if the state perceives the disable

specifically include narrow language on the

parent unable, or unfit to care for the child. 61

type of intellectual disability being targeting

The remaining 15 states do not include

by the state. 99

intellectual disability in their termination of

The state of Mississippi is one such

parental right statutes. The 3 5 states that do

state to accomplish a narrowly tailored

are: Alabama 62 , Alaska 63 , Arkansas 64
.
65
.C"
•
66
A nzona
, C a111orma
, Colorado 67

,

statute addressing the matter of intellectual

,

disability as grounds for parental rights

Delaware 68 , District of Columbia 69 ,
. 70 , H awan.. 71 , Ill.mois
. n , I owa 73 ,
G eorgia

termination. Mississippi's statute reads: "If

Kentucky 75 , Maryland 76 ,
· · ·78 , M.1ssoun.79 ,
M assac husetts n , M.1ss1ss1pp1
Kansas

74

,

Montana 80 , Nebraska 81 , Nevada 82 , New
. 83 , N ew J ersey 84 , N ew M ex1co
. 85 ,
H amps h Ire
New York

86

,

North Carolina 87

,

North

Dakota 88 , Ohio 89 , Oklahoma 90 , Oregon 91 ,
92

93

94

South Carolina , Tennessee , Texas ,
. . . 95 , w ash.mgton 96 an d w·1sconsm
. 97 .98
V Irg1ma
No one statute is a mirror-image of the
another statute. The language varies. This
variance is discussed below.

established

by

clear

and

convmcmg

evidence," 100 grounds for termination of the
parent's parental rights is appropriate, if
reunification between the parent and child is
not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory
permanency outcome:
The
parent
has
been
medically diagnosed by a
qualified
mental
health
professional with a severe
mental illness or deficiency
that is unlikely to change in a
reasonable period of time and
which, based upon expert
testimony or an established
pattern of behavior, makes

111

the
parent
unable
or
unwilling to provide an
adequate permanent home for
the child. 101

Per the language of Washington's
statute,

Mississippi uses the term "severe" 102
in its language when addressing a parent's
intellectual disability. 103 It is cl ear the state
of Mississippi requires a history of behavior
connected to a "severe"
mandating

a

pattern

104

of

disability by
behavior

be

established to empirically prove the parent is

language

when

state

that

addressing

narrows

its

intellectual

disability as a ground for termination of
parental rights is the state of Washington.
Washington's termination of parental right
statute allows for the court to consider:
Psychological incapacity or
mental deficiency of the
parent that is so severe and
chronic as to render the
parent incapable of providing
proper care for the child for
extended periods of time or
for periods of time that
present a risk of imminent
harm to the child and
documented unwilling~ess of
the parent to receive and
complete
treatment
or
documentation that there is
no treatment that can render
the
parent
capable
of
providing proper care for the
child in the near future. 105

state

requires

a

parent's

intellectual disability be "so severe and
. " 106 t hat 1t
. p1aces the child in
chromc
imminent

harm .

107

L"k
1 e

Mississippi,

Washington narrows the overbroad and
rather ambiguous definition of intellectual
disability.

108

Interesting! y,

unlike

Mississippi, Washington provides a second
prong to this ground for termination by
requiring documentation of the parent's

truly unfit to provide for the child.
Another

the

"unwillingness" 109 to receive and complete
treatment, or that no such treatment would
render proper, future care of the child. 110 In
effect, Washington seems to be com batting
bias and presumption by placing a higher
burden on the state to convey an unfit
intellectually disabled parent or parents.
The state of Virginia parallels the
narrow language employed by Mississippi
and Washington. In Virginia's termination
of parental rights statute, the language reads
as follows:
The parent or parents have a
mental or emotional illness or
intellectual
disability
of
such severity that there is no
reasonable expectation that
such parent will be able to
undertake responsibility for
the care needed by the child
in accordance with his age
and stage of development. 111

112

Dissimilar
Washington,

to

Mississippi

Virginia

"intellectual disability"

uses
112

the

and
phrase

The phrase "developmental disability" 116 is
defined by Wisconsin as:

in its statute.

a disability attributable to
intellectual disability. . . or
another
neurological
condition closely related to
an intellectual disability or
requiring treatment similar to
that required for individuals
with an intellectual disability,
which has continued or can
be expected to continue
indefinitely,
substantially
impairs an individual from
adequately providing for his
or her own care or custody,
and constitutes a substantial
handicap to the afflicted
individual. 117

Virginia categorizes intellectual disability by
the 'severity' of one's mental state
Virginia

conscientiously

113

disallows

Thus,
state

actors from terminating parental rights on a
basis other than a parent's severe intellectual
disability .114
Termination of parental rights in
other states share similar goals to the
aforementioned states. However, these states
do not use "severe" or "severity" to classify
intellectual disability. Instead, these states
use alternative terms or restrictive language

Wisconsin's definition of developmental

to

intellectual

disability does not contain any reference to

statutory

the severity of one's mental state. 118 Instead

classify

disabilities.

the

different

For example, the

section regarding a parent's intellectual

the

disability as a ground for termination in the

"substantially impairs an individual" 119 with

state of Wisconsin's says:

an intellectual disability.

Continuing
parental
disability, which shall be
established by proving that:
The parent is presently, and
for a cumulative total period
of at least 2 years within the
5 years immediately prior to
the filing of the petition has
been, an inpatient at one or
more hospitals. . . licensed
treatment facilities ... or state
treatment facilities. . . on
account of . . developmental
disability. 115

definition

utilizes
12

the

phrase

° Consequently,

when Wisconsin's termination of parental
rights statute is read in conjunction with the
definition section, it is clear the state's
approach

to

termination

1s

narrowly

confined to situations involving a period of
recent institutionalization for an intellectual
disability that impairs the parent to a
substantial degree.
Mississippi, Washington, Virginia
and Wisconsin are not the only states
narrowmg

their

statutory

language

113

surrounding intellectual
ground for termination.

disability
The

as

a

states of

like

Kentucky,

Mississippi,

Virginia,

Washington and Wisconsin.

Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and New

For example, the state of New York

Hampshire implement language most similar

has overbroad statutory language when

to that of Wisconsin. 121 But, there is a key

addressing intellectual disability as a ground

difference between Wisconsin's language

for termination. New York's statute reads:

and three of these four states mentioned

The parent or parents. . . are
presently
and
for
the
foreseeable future unable, by
reason.
intellectual
disability, to provide proper
and adequate care for a child
who has been in the care of
an authorized agency for the
period
of
one
year
immediately prior to the date
on which the petition is filed
in the court. 124

above. As previously stated, Wisconsin uses
"substantially impairs an individual,"

122

when defining the severity of intellectual
disability. Delaware, Illinois and Kentucky
use language like, "significantly sub-average
general intellectual functioning"

123

when

defining intellectual disability. Refer back to
the

general

definition

of

intellectual

disability in this article and the problem is

New York's termination statute attempts to

clear; the latter language used defines the

connect a parent's intellectual disability to

intellectual

monolithically.

the capacity of the parent to provide care to

a

sub-average

child, yet it offers no language that narrows

intellect of an individual, so this definition

the class of intellectually disabled parents. 125

offers nothing more than simply defining the

New

disability in its most general form.

disability" 126 is overly broad and states in

Intellectual

disability
disability

is

2. A Majority
Employ
Overbroad
Language

of States
Statutory

York's

use

of

"intellectual

this majority employ comparable, overly
broad language.

127

Due to New York's

broad language, the statute doesn't account
The remaining states and the District
of Columbia use overbroad language in their
statutes addressing intellectual disability as a

for how stratified the class of intellectually
disabled parents are, and thus harms those
parents who are fit to provide care.

ground for termination of parental rights of a
child. These states are the antithesis to states

114

III.
INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY
SHOULD
NOT
BE
ENTIRELY
ELIMINATED
FROM
STATUTOTY
LANGAUGE,
BUT
SHOULD
NARROWLY ADDRESS THE CLASS OF
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY

article

intellectual

'

disability can be the sole ground for
termination of parental rights, it can become
.

.

the focus of child protect10n cases.

128

Accordingly, states should crystalize their
statutes to reflect the heterogeneous group of
individuals that are intellectually disabled
parents. Most states, if not all, should
parallel Mississippi, Washington, Virginia's
statutory language because the language
preempts non-severe intellectually disabled
parents being swept into the scope of
foreseeable child abuse and neglect, or
general unfitness to provide for the child.
The

rights

of

an

intellectually

disabled parent should not hinge on a
"compassionate judge that understands the
. d"IVI"dua1s. ,,129 M ore
issues faced by [these] m

importantly, parental rights should not hinge
on unjustifiable, overly broad language in
state statutes addressing termination of
parental

rights.

Disability is the only

instance in which it is acceptable and legal
to terminate parental rights of a group of
individuals based on a condition rather than
.
. th"IS
a behavior. 130 As prev10usly
state d m

IS

not a

homogenous group of people.
While,
disabilities

currently,

in

many

discrimination
While no state says that intellectual

disability

m

parents

states

child

with

may

face

custody

and

termination of parental rights proceedings,
this

can be

changed.

States need to

reconsider the inclusion of disability in child
custody codes. Highlighted in the discussion
surrounding New York's termination statute,
overly broad language doesn't account for
the three immensely different classifications
of intellectually disabled parents. Overly
broad language and non-specific definitions
of intellectual disability sweeps non-severe
parents who are perfectly able to provide
adequate, reasonable care for their child,
under the deleterious rug of court ordered
termination.

States must evaluate their

current language of termination of parental
rights statutes and consider altering the
language

used

to

define

intellectual

disability as a ground for termination to
reflect severe forms intellectual disability,
like Mississippi, Virginia and Washington.
States must be pressed upon to eliminate
overly broad

statutes and alternatively

modify their statutes with terminology that
is indicative of the varying classes of the
intellectual disabled community.
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A Addressing Environmental Risks
Posed to Children Whose Parent Is
Intellectually Disabled

Now a child can have "genetic and
'

environmental vulnerability" 135 if that child
has an intellectually disabled parent or

As addressed throughout this Article,
individuals with intellectual disability are a
diverse group, with a substantial, varying
degree

of "attitudes...

adaptability.

131

aptitudes"

and

Understandably so, some

concern may be raised when one thinks
about the environment a child is subject to
with a parent who falls within the mild or
moderate class of intellectual disability. This
level of concern and risk escapes few; even
those

advocating

for

stricter,

narrow

parents. This vulnerability can make them
susceptible to extensive responsibilities at
home, sub-par school performance, guilt and
isolation, anti-social behaviors and various
mental disorders. 136 However, it should be
noted, children of substance abusers are
almost three times more likely to be
physically or sexually assaulted than other
children, more than four times more likely to
be neglected,

substance abusers themselves. 137

statutory language in termination of parental
rights statutes.

Ultimately, the classification of the
intellectual disability may be "the most

Notwithstanding

this

genume

concern, researchers have often come to find
that intellectually disabled parents exhibit
"unexpected strengths" m parenting tests
while providing their children with a
growmg

intellectually

environment.

132

stimulating

Parents with intellectual

disability often have limited effect on a
child's

and more likely to be

behavior

and

development.

important predictors of parenting success" in
fostering

a

safe,

loving,

enriching

environment for their child. 138 Yet, evidence
overwhelmingly displays that non-severe
intellectually

disabled

parents

can

adequately and positively care for their
children with, if needed, certain levels
treatment and support. 139

133

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, this class of parents are more
Nothing stated above is saying every

likely to be successful parents and members
of society when they "enjoy the virtues of
. ,,134 not
interdependence and communa11ty;
hindered by stereotypes and marginalization.

single actor in the legal system, and its
agents

across

this

nation

routinely,

systematically and purposely discriminates
against intellectually disabled parents. To
the contrary, there are a number of judges
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who are enlightened on this particular

Thus, overly broad intellectual disability

disability and consequently deny termination

language in termination of parental rights

for parents who have limited cognitive

statutes must cease because smarter people

140

ability.

However, preservation of the

do not inherently make for better parents, so

family nucleus for these individuals cannot

why penalize those parents with non-severe

rely on the hope that their case gets assigned

cognitive inability. When more states begin

to an enlightened judge.

to follow Mississippi's and Washington's

Plenty

are

example of narrow statutory language, these

intellectual

states will be practicing more effective,

disability does, or can, render them unfit to

more equitable family law. Justice is needed

provide care for their child. In matters,

for this community. The family nucleus

similar to the Oregonian couple, 141 the state

must be protected and preserved for all.

terminated

of

parents'

because

rights

their

should not come running at the ring of the
intellectual disability bell and remove a
child

from

their

mild

or

moderate

intellectually disabled parent; especially
when there is no finding of prima facia
abuse or neglect.
In conclusion, states must evaluate
their current language of termination of
parental

rights

statutes.

States

should

consider altering their language to parallel
'severe'

language used by

states like

Mississippi, Virginia and Washington. In
addition, states must be pressed upon to
eliminate

overly

broad

statutes

and

alternatively modify their statutes with
terminology that is indicative of the varying
classes

of

community.

the

intellectually

disabled
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